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nan, Marshall and Stevens, filed a dissenting opinion and argued that the
majority's holding was in direct conflict
with the plain meaning of the Confrontation Clause. The dissenters attacked
the majority's analogy to the admission
of hearsay evidence, noting that the
hearsay exceptions generally included a
requirement of the unavailability of the
declarant, a point which the majority
seemed to ignore. Id. at 3174 (Scalia,].,
dissenting). Concluding, the dis.sent
stated: "The Court today has applied 'interest balancing' analysis where the text
of the Constitution simply does not
permit it. We are not free to conduct a
cost-benefit analysis of clear and explicit
constitutional guarantees, and then to
adjust their meaning to comport to our
findings." Id. at 3176 (Scalia,]., dissenting). "[T]he text of the Sixth Amendment is clear, and because the Constitution is meant to protect against, rather
than conform to, current 'widespread
belief,' I respectfully dissent." Id. at
3172 (Scalia,]., dissenting).
The opinion of the Supreme Court in
Maryland v. Craig validates a procedure
which will greatly increase the State's
ability to successfully prosecute alleged
perpetrators of child abuse. Perhaps
more importantly, this opinion reveals
the willingness of the current Court to
look beyond the literal meaning of constitutional guarantees and instead concentrate on the "essence" of the right,
thereby preserving the notion of the
Constitution as a flexible document.
- Gregory J. Swain
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.:
OPINIONS ARE NOT
PROTECTED BY THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND ARE
THEREFORE ACTIONABLE
UNDER STATE UBEL LAW
In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,
110 S. Ct. 2695 ( 1990) the United States
Supreme Court held that statements of
opinion are not protected by the first
amendment and, therefore, are actionable under state libel law. In holding so,
the Court reversed the Ohio Court of
Appeals and remanded the case for a
determination as to whether the statements were true or false.
Lorain Journal Co. published an article authored by J. Theodore Diadiun
(hereinafter "respondents") including
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incriminating comments about the petitioner, Michael Milkovich, a high school
wrestling coach whose team was involved in an altercation following a
match. Milkovich and Scott, the school
superintendent, testified at the Ohio
High School Athletic Association
(OHSAA) investigatory hearing and subsequent trial. Both proceedings were
discussed in a journal article entitled
"Maple beat the law with the 'big lie,'''
along with a picture of Diadiun and the
words "TO says." Among other phrases,
the article contained the following passage: "Anyone who attended the meet...
knows in his heart that Milkovich and
Scott lied at the hearing after each having given his solemn oath to tell the
truth." Id. at 2698. Thus, Milkovich and
Scott brought separate defamation actions against the respondents in Ohio
State Court. Id. at 2699.
Milkovich alleged that the article directly damaged his occupation of coach
and teacher by accusing him of committing perjury, and that this constituted
libel per se. Id. A directed verdict was
granted in favor of the respondents on
the grounds that there was insufficient
evidence to establish "actual malice" as
required by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Milkovich,
110 S. Ct. at 2699. The Ohio Court of
Appeals disagreed and the decision was
reversed and remanded. Id. at 2700.
On remand, the trial court granted
the respondent's motion for summary
judgment, holding that the article con·
stituted opinion constitutionally protected from a libel action. Alternatively,
the court found that Milkovich, as a public figure, failed to make out a prima
facie case of actual malice. The court of
appeals affirmed. Id
On appeal, the Supreme Court of
Ohio found that Milkovich was neither a
public figure nor a public official. The
court also held that the statements were
factual assertions as a matter of law and
not constitutionally protected as the
opinions of the writer. Id
Two years later, the Ohio Supreme
Court reversed its position in Scott's
defamation action, finding that the column was constitutionally protected
opinion Id. The Scott court, in ascertaining whether the column was fact or
opinion under the totality of the circumstances, applied the four factor

analysis established by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in
Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C.
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127
(1985). Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2700.
Those factors were "( 1) 'the specific
language used;' (2) 'whether the statement is verifiable;' (3) 'the general context of the statement;' and (4) 'the
broader context in which the statement
appeared.'" Id. (quoting Scott v. NewsHerald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 250, 496
N.E.2d 699,706 (1986».
Although the Scott court determined that the first two factors indicated that
the statements at issue were assertions
of fact, the court held that based on the
third and fourth factors the article was
opinion as a matter of law. Id. With
respect to the third, "general context of
the statement," factor, "the large caption 'TO says' ... would indicate to even
the most gullible reader that the article
was, in fact, opinion." Id. (quotingScott,
25 Ohio St. 3d at 252, 496 N.E.2d at
707). With respect to the fourth factor,
the "broader context in which the statement appeared," the court reasoned
that because the article appeared on a
sports page - 'a traditional haven for
cajoling, invective, and hyperbole,' that
article would probably be construed as
opinion.Id. at 2701 (quoting Scott, 25
Ohio St. 3d at 253-54, 496 N.E.2d at
708). As a result of the Scott decision
the Ohio Court of Appeals upheld a
summary judgment against Milkovich.
Id. An appeal to the Supreme Court of
Ohio was dismissed for want of a substantial constitutional question, and the
United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider the Ohio court's
recognition of a constitutionally required opinion exception under the
first amendment.
The Supreme Court began its analysis
by discussing the development of defamation law under the common law. The
Court first stressed the importance of
allowing a person to vindicate his good
name while affording redress for harm
caused by defamatory statements. Id. at
2702.
At common law, a defamed private
figure needed only to prove a false publication which subjected him to "hatred,
contempt, or ridicule." Id. (quoting
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 370 (1974) (White, ]., dissenting». The distinction between fact and

opinion, the Court explained, did not
be presumed that defamatory speech
involve a media defendant. Id. (citing
exist.Id.
was false, as under common law. MoreHepps, 475 U.S. at 772).
The Court explained, however, that
over, the burden of showing falsity and
Turning to the facts of the instant
the affirmative defense known as "fair
fault was on the allegedly defamed plaincase, the Court found that the language
comment" was incorporat<;:d into comtiff and not on the media defendant who
used in the article about Milkovich was
mon law, applying only to expressions of
previously was required to prove truth.
not "loose, figurative or hyperbolic lanopinion. This principle, "afford[ed] legal
Id. (citing Philadelphia Newspapers,
guage." Id Additionally, the Court stated
immunity for the honest expression of
Inc.v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776(1986».
that neither the language, nor the general
opinion on matters of legitimate public
tenor of the article, negated the impresThe Court then noted its recognition
interest when based upon a true or privision that the author seriously maintained
of constitutional limitations on the type
leged statement of fact." Id. at 2703
that Milkovich committed the crime of
of speech which could serve as a basis
(quoting 1 F. Harper & F. James, Law of
perjury. Id.
for a defamation action. Id ConstituTorts § 5.28 (1956». The Court found
The Court noted that the truth could
tionallyprotected speech, not subject to
that the purpose of "fair comment" was
be ascertained by comparing, inter alia,
defamation law included "loose figurato balance free and uninhibited discustive speech," "merely rhetorical hyperMilkovich's testimony at the OHSAA
sion of public issues with the need to
bole," as well as, "lusty and imaginative
hearing with his subsequent testimony
redress injury to reputation caused by
expression of contempt." Id. at 2705
in trial court. Therefore, the connotainvidious irresponsible speech. Id.
(quoting Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418
tion that Milkovich committed perjury
To further protect freedom of speech,
U.S. 264, 284-86 (1974».
was an articulation of an objectively
Milkovich, attempted to persuade the
freedom of the press and uninhibited
verifiable event. Id. Consequently, the
Court to recognize an additional protecdebate, the Court explained, it began to
Court remanded the case for a determition for statements characterized as
require public officials to prove defamanation of whether or not the statements
opinions as opposed to fact. He relied on
tory statements were made with 'actual
were false.
dictum from Gertz which basically reitmalice.' Id. (citing New York Times Co.
In reaching its conclusion, the SueratedJustice Holmes' "marketplace of
v. Sullivan, 376 u.s. 254 (1964». The
preme Court managed to intricately balideas" concept. Id. Yet the argument,
New York Times 'actual malice' test was
ance first amendment values. Namely, it
equating "opinion" with "idea," was relater extended to public figures, defined
balanced the vital guarantee of freedom
jected by the Court, which stated that
as those persons "intimately involved in
of speech as it relates to the press and
the passage relied upon from Gertz was
the resolution of important public questhe uninhibited discussion of public
not "intended to create a wholesale deftions or, by reason of their fame, shape
issues against the pervasively strong inamation exception for anything that
events in areas of concern to society at
terest of preventing reputations from
might be labeled 'opinion.'" Id.
large." Id. (quoting Curtis Publishing
being falsely dishonored. Thus, the
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967». The
The Court noted that expressions of
Court, in a unanimous decision, opted
required standard of prooffor both pubopinion may often imply an assertion of
not to provide even more protection to
lic officials and public figures, the Court
objective facts. Id. For example, the
media defendants by failing to recognize
noted, was clear and convincing evistatement "[i]n my opinion Jones is a
an opinion exception to state defamadence.Id. at 2703-04 (citing Gertz, 418
liar," the court believed could cause as
tion laws.
U.S. at 342).
much damage to one's reputation as the
- Kimberly A. Doyle
statement, "Jones is a liar." Id. at 2706.
The distinction between public and
"[It] would be destructive of the law of
private individuals, the Court reasoned,
libel if a writer could escape liability for
was predicated not only on the fact that
accusationsof[ defumatoryconduct ] simply
Illinois v. Perkins: UNDERCOVER
public persons voluntarily exposed themby using, explicitly or implicitly, the
AGENTS NEED NOT GIVE
selves to the increased risk of defamawords 'I think.'" Id. (quoting Cianci v.
tion, but also had greater opportunity to
MIRANDA WARNINGS TO
New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54,
INCARCERATED SUSPECTS
counteract any false statements through
64 (2d Cir. 1980».
BEFORE ASKING QUESTIONS
effective communication channels. Id
at 2704 (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344WHICH MAY EliCIT
The Court stated that public figures
45). However, the Court did not extend
INCRIMINATING RESPONSES
and officials must show that defamatory
the 'actual malice' standard to private
In Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. 2394
statements were made with knowledge
persons concerning matters of public
( 1990), the Supreme Court held that
of their falsity or with reckless disregard
of the truth. Id. at 2707. Alternatively,
interest. Id. (citing Rosenbloom v.
the fifth amendment does not require
statements involving private individuals
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 ( 1971 ) ).
undercover government agents posing
on matters of public concern place the
The Court discussed further limitaas inmates to give Miranda warnings to
incarcerated suspects before asking
tions placed on the damages recoveraburden on the plaintiff to show that the
questions that may elicit incriminating
ble in libel actions. First, liability could
false connotations were made with some
responses. The Court found that no
not be imposed without some showing
level of fault as required by Gertz. Id
coercive atmosphere exists when an
of fault. Id. Second, punitive damages
Thus, on matters of public concern,
were not recoverable without a showincarcerated suspect voluntarily makes
statements must be provable as false
ing of 'actual malice.' Id Finally, the
incriminating statements to an officer
before liability can be imposed under
he assumes to be a fellow inmate.
Court had held that it could no longer
state defamation laws, at least when they
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